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12 September 2018 saw the European Parliament (EP) vote in favour of launching Article 7 TEU 
proceedings against the Hungarian government on the basis of a European Parliament Report 
prepared by MEP Judit Sargentini. Published on 4 July 2018, the Report provided evidence 
raising serious rule of law concerns about Viktor Orbán’s government. Earlier the same day, the 
President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker expressed worry in his speech on 
the State of the Union about the developments in some EU member states and, clearly having 
the Hungarian government in mind, emphasized that Article 7 “must be applied whenever the 
rule of law is threatened”. 
Much controversy has emerged following the EP vote, along with a great deal of confusion 
about the actual significance, scope and implications of this decision, all of which require 
clarification. The vote is a very welcome marker of the EU’s commitment to upholding its 
founding principles in relation to member state governments. It constitutes a clear warning for 
Viktor Orbán’s government from the main European institution directly representing European 
citizens at EU level.   
The Parliament’s vote constitutes only a preliminary step in effectively addressing and repairing 
the ongoing systemic challenges to the rule of law in Hungary. It also comes too late and can 
be expected to have little short-term impact, as the procedure it triggers is very much based 
on political considerations. If anything, the controversy highlights the inherent structural flaws 
that render the current procedures and tools available to the European institutions less than 
fully effective in countering threats to the rule of law in countries once they have acceded to 
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the Union. It is therefore time for the EU to equip itself with a robust EU Periodic Review (EUPR) 
which would secure a permanent and comparative assessment – based on independent 
evidence – of compliance with the democratic rule of law and fundamental rights commitments 
by all member states. 
Too Late 
The decision to start Article 7 TEU proceedings against the Hungarian government has come 
long after evidence of serious and systemic threats to the rule of law in the country became 
overwhelming. Since coming to power in 2010, the Orbán government has actively and 
strategically engaged in major constitutional re-design in the country.  
First it paved the way with a well-thought through process of deconstructing checks and 
balances. The independence of the judiciary has been compromised in numerous ways. By 
introducing new age limits for retirement with immediate effect, 27% of Supreme Court judges 
and more than 50 % of appeal court presidents were removed, and the positions were filled by 
lawyers loyal to the government. The President of the Supreme Court was removed from office 
in an irregular manner, condemned by the European Court of Human Rights. Since 2010, the 
power and independence of the Hungarian Constitutional Court have been diminished. The 
ombudsman system, with one general and several specialised parliamentary representatives 
for various human rights, has ceased to exist.  
The curtailment of media diversity has been a well-documented step in neutering criticism of 
government policies. However academic freedom has also been severely jeopardized. Perhaps 
the attacks against the CEU are best known – with an infringement proceeding pending. But 
freedom of thought is also challenged in the way funds for state universities are distributed, 
attempts to impose government influence on the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the 
government’s witch hunt against gender studies. In the past year, the government has engaged 
in the criminalisation of civil society. New laws, notably the ‘Stop Soros Legislative Package’, are 
subjecting them to extraordinary tax procedures, stigmatising those with external support and 
penalising anyone providing humanitarian assistance to asylum seekers and irregular 
immigrants.  
State capture is achieved through patronage and clientelism: both high positions in state 
institutions and beyond are given to allies in return for party loyalty, and also public funds – 
including EU subsidies – are used to build and strengthen the illiberal regime and create a new 
economic elite. Corruption is not only on a different scale, it is also qualitatively different from 
that in democratic countries where the rule of law holds sway: Hungary is contaminated by 
institutionalised corruption to a degree that public institutions are rendered incapable of 
fulfilling public goals; instead they exclusively serve the interests of those in power. Hungary’s 
dubious golden visa scheme, the serious irregularities found by the European Anti-Fraud Office 
in relation to companies co-owned by Orbán’s son-in-law, are just some of the more obvious 
examples of clientelism and corruption.  
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Too Little 
Article 7 TEU is notorious for its burdensome and procedurally ineffective nature. It consists of 
a preventive arm (determining a clear risk of a breach of the rule of law) and a corrective 
dimension (determining a serious and persistent breach). It is only within the scope of this 
second dimension that the provision foresees the possibility to apply sanctions to the EU 
member state concerned. Sanctions may include, but are not limited to, suspension of voting 
rights inside the Council. While this is the first time that the EP has called on the Council to put 
the Article 7 TEU procedure in motion and to address a systematic threat to EU values in a 
specific EU country, the impact of the vote should however not be overestimated.  
The EP’s vote is just a preliminary step towards the opening of Article 7’s preventive arm. The 
vote merely constitutes a formal invitation to the Council to open up a procedure to ascertain 
whether there is actually a real risk that the Hungarian government is breaching the rule of law. 
It is by no means a decision concluding that this is in fact the case. It is now entirely up to EU 
member state governments in the Council to decide whether to respond to the Parliament’s 
invitation and start the procedure. In addition, the provisions of Article 7 set a too high 
threshold inside the Council in order to activate the procedure: a four-fifths majority is needed 
to invoke the preventive arm, whereas the corrective arm can be vetoed by any member state. 
It is therefore plausible that the Parliament’s vote will lead to very little in practice.  
As documented above, it is striking that a first decisive move has taken so many years. The rule 
of law challenges in Hungary and Poland have been qualitatively very similar and closely 
interrelated, in many respects even mimicking each other. Yet the European Commission has 
remained in official disengagement on ‘rule of law matters’ from the Hungarian government, 
while openly implementing since 2016 a structured dialogue with Polish authorities, in the 
scope of the so-called EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law. This EU Framework was 
criticised at the outset in 2015 for treating member states differently and the Commission’s 
inaction in respect of Hungary was questioned in early 2016. 
Though the case of Poland has illustrated the ineffectiveness of this ‘pre-Article 7 procedure’ 
in preventing the emergence of a systemic threat to the rule of law – as testified by several 
Opinions of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe indicating that instead threats to 
the rule of law in Poland escalated over the past two years, the European Commission’s 
subsequent activation of Article 7 TEU against Poland only accentuated the differential 
treatment.  While it is true that the Commission launched a whole series of much needed 
infringement procedures against the Hungarian government, they by no means deal with the 
root causes of the challenges to the rule of law in the country.  
Too Political 
The Article 7 TEU procedure leaves the decision to start investigating the legality of EU Member 
States’ actions in light of EU values entirely in the hands of a political decision by Parliament, 
the European Commission or a majority of member states. Even the instigation of the 
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procedure is highly politicized: the recent support in the EP for opening an Article 7 TEU 
procedure against Hungary cannot be understood without taking into account the race for the 
Presidency of the next European Commission and the role of the European People’s Party (EPP) 
leader in that context. 
It is furthermore left entirely in the Council’s hands to assess and decide whether a member 
state displays a risk or an actual threat to the rule of law that could put European integration 
and cooperation in jeopardy. There is no independent evaluation, or any judicial scrutiny of the 
procedure with no role attributed to the Court of Justice of the EU in Luxembourg regarding 
Article 7 TEU outputs. The above-mentioned EU Framework leaves the Commission too much 
discretion in dealing or proceeding with the envisaged procedure, or taking any further follow-
up steps. The Commission has no formal role attributed by the Treaties once the Article 7 
procedure is opened, leaving the affair solely to inter-governmental closed-doors business.  
Both the underlying assessment under the Rule of Law Framework and Article 7 TEU procedure 
lack independence, impartiality and legal rigour. They also do not ensure equality of treatment 
among all EU member states. Risks and outstanding issues on the rule of law are not only visible 
in countries like Poland and Hungary, but an ongoing challenge at different scales and degrees 
across the Union. Cases in point are Malta and Bulgaria.  
Orbán has qualified the EP’s vote as a “fraud” and a “petty revenge” for its hard-line migration 
policy. However, this is disingenuous. The vote of 12 September 2018 is not about migration 
policy. Rather, most of the rule of law concerns documented in the EP report (corruption and 
conflicts of interest, threats to academic freedom and freedom of assembly as well as the 
functioning of the constitutional and electoral system and judicial independence) directly and 
intimately affect the rights and interests of Hungarian citizens. 
Priorities for Way Forward 
A key priority for the period of EU inter-institutional renewal expected to begin during 2019 
should be to de-politicise and further strengthen the EU rule of law procedures and tools. The 
EU should equip itself with a permanent, comparative and periodic qualitative assessment of 
compliance with Article 2 TEU principles and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This could 
follow the model of the United Nations (UN) Universal Periodic Review.  
A new EU Period Review (EUPR) on Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights should be 
established covering all EU member states and be based on a regular and independent 
assessment of all relevant existing international sources of evidence on compliance with EU 
values. It should be accompanied by a new EU Rule of Law Commission of high-level 
personalities and experts – following the template of the Council of Europe Venice Commission 
– which would autonomously assess these issues and challenges in the context of EU 
specificities and the fields of competence laid down in the Treaties and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. No Treaty change would be required to implement these proposals. 
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Moreover, current obstacles for making Article 7 TEU operational should be re-designed so as 
to secure its effectiveness and legitimacy. The procedural weight of Council voting 
requirements under Article 7 TEU should be reduced. The outputs of the preventive and 
corrective arm in Article 7 TEU should also be subjected to the judicial oversight of the 
Luxembourg Court. Such improvements would call for Treaty change. 
Rule of law backsliding is not exclusively a member state matter. Beyond harming the nationals 
of the country concerned, Union citizens residing in that country are also detrimentally 
affected. The lack of limitations on ‘illiberal practices’ may encourage other member state 
governments to follow suit. Moreover, all EU citizens may suffer to some extent from the 
participation of that member state in the EU’s decision-making mechanisms. At the very least, 
the legitimacy of the Union’s decision-making process will be jeopardised.  
For EU law to be operational and trust-based, whether in the context of the single market or in 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, certain presumptions must hold and not be taken 
for granted. This is the case in respect of the presupposition that after accession to the EU, all 
member states are democratic countries based on the rule of law and compliant with 
fundamental rights, where legal disputes are resolved by an independent judiciary, equality of 
the law applies to everyone, contracts are enforced and infringements of human rights are 
remedied.  
If EU institutions do not respond meaningfully to rule of law backsliding and systematic 
violations of EU values, this will weaken the very fabric of the EU legal order and challenge the 
nature of the European integration project as we know it. 
